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THE PARTS WE SKIP: A TAXONOMY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCY 
Peter Beck* 
I. A “VERSION” OF THE CONSTITUTION 
On January 6, 2011, for the first time in the history of 
Congress, the Constitution was read out loud on the House floor.1 
“We hope,” said Rep. Bob Goodlatte, who organized the event, 
“this will inspire many more Americans to read the 
Constitution.”2 There are millions of pocket-sized Constitutions 
in circulation; millions of Americans could have taken 
Goodlatte’s advice and followed along in their copies of the text.3 
Speaker of the House John Boehner began the reading: “We the 
People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
Union . . . .”4 
In a show of bipartisanship, the reading alternated between 
Republican and Democratic members. After Boehner finished 
the Preamble, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi took over: 
“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .” Then Rep. Cantor, “No 
person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to 
the age of twenty-five years and been seven years a citizen of the 
 
 * With thanks to Jill Hasday and the editors of Constitutional Commentary, 
Meredith Foster, Akhil Amar, and, especially, Lizzy Beck. 
 1. Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in House, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/politics/07constitution.html. 
 2. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th CONG., READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
157, at H53–62 (COMM. PRINT 2011). 
 3. There are at least twenty million copies of two pocket editions of the Constitution 
alone, printed by the National Center for Constitutional Studies and the Cato Institute. 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, copyright page (National Center for 
Constitutional Studies eds., 2nd ed. 2016) (“Over 16 million copies distributed.”); Cato 
Institute, The Cato Pocket Constitution, CATO INSTITUTE, 
https://store.cato.org/book/cato-pocket-constitution (“more than five million copies in 
print.”). 
 4. READING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 53–54. All following quotes 
from the congressional reading come from the Congressional Record. 
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United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant 
of that State in which he shall be chosen.” For those following 
along at home, everything seemed all right. But then Rep. Cantor 
continued: “The actual enumeration shall be made within three 
Years . . . .” Even just listening to the reading, something sounded 
off: “The actual enumeration . . .” What enumeration? For 
readers following along, it was even more jarring. A whole 
sentence had been skipped, as Rep. Cantor jumped from the 
requirements for Representatives to the establishment of the 
census. The missing sentence apportioned taxes and 
Congressional representation according to state population, 
“adding to the whole Number of free Persons . . . three fifths of 
all other Persons.”5 The three-fifths compromise, included in the 
Constitution to appease slave states during the Framing, must be 
one of the most famous clauses in the document.6 Why had it been 
skipped over? 
The reading continued. Rep. Hoyer read the original number 
of Representatives for each state; Rep. McCarthy read the 
establishment of the Senate: “The Senate of the United State shall 
be composed of two Senators from each State for six years.” 
Again—something was wrong. This awkward-sounding sentence 
was missing a whole clause after “each State”: “chosen by the 
Legislature thereof.”7 Another missing phrase between Reps. 
Rothman and Conaway (Senate recess appointments)8 and a 
whole sentence gone between Reps. Poe and Weiner.9 Rep. 
Keating read the clause enshrining the slave trade until 1808, and 
Rep. Schiff read the Fugitive Slave Clause, but a whole paragraph 
about the electoral system10 was cut between Reps. Payne and 
Young, as was a paragraph about presidential succession11 
between Reps. Pallone and Griffith. What was being kept in and 
what was getting cut out? It was almost impossible to follow along. 
Rep. Fortenberry read the second 1808 clause of the Constitution, 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 6. See, e.g., the extended discussion of the three-fifths clause in a typical and popular 
high school U.S. History textbook, ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY! 205-06, 234 (brief 4th 
ed. 2014). 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every 
Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall be law 
appoint a different Day.”) 
 10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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Rep. Matsui read about Confederation debt—Rep. Hirono even 
read the interlinear notes after Article VII, corrections from the 
parchment copy: “The word ‘the’ being interlined between the 
seventh and eight lines of the first page . . . .” Four 
Representatives read the signatories, but only from New 
Hampshire through Pennsylvania. By the time they got to 
Delaware, the Representatives had moved on to reading the 
rarely-encountered “Preamble” to the Bill of Rights. Part of the 
Twelfth Amendment was skipped, but the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s reference to voting rights for “male inhabitants . . . 
twenty-one years of age” was included. Reps. Clarke and Ellmers 
read about Confederate veterans and debt, but the Eighteenth 
Amendment was skipped entirely. This led to even more 
confusion when Rep. Platts read the Twenty-First Amendment: 
“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States is hereby repealed.” The Representatives read the 
ratification dates for the Nineteenth and the Twenty-First through 
Twenty-Seventh Amendments, but only for those. Finally, after 
Rep. Fincher finished the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, Rep. 
Goodlatte concluded: “We have now completed the first reading 
aloud of the United States Constitution.” Had they? 
Rep. Goodlatte insists that they read (and have continued to 
read in recent Congresses12) “the Constitution as it currently 
operates.”13 In an email from his Communications Director, 
Goodlatte elaborated: “Members read the version of the 
Constitution printed by the Government Printing Office . . . 
omitting those sections the GPO version brackets-off as 
superseded . . . . They do not read inoperative clauses . . . .”14 It 
might be a surprise to learn that there are versions of the 
 
 12. The latest—fourth—congressional reading of the Constitution took place on 
January 5, 2017. As with earlier readings, the 115th Congress continued to skip parts of the 
text. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 115th CONG., READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 163, 
at H101–08 (COMM. PRINT 2017) (skipping, for instance, the Three-Fifths Clause and the 
Eighteenth Amendment). The 116th Congress has yet to continue the Constitution-
reading tradition. David Sherfinski, House Democrats Put off Rite of Reading Constitution 
to Convene New Congress, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2019/jan/8/house-democrats-put-rite-reading-constitution-conv/. 
 13. Philip Rucker & David A. Fahrenthold, After Wrangling, Constitution is Read on 
House Floor, Minus Passages on Slavery, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010602807.html. 
 14. E-mail from Beth Breeding, Commc’ns Dir. for Congressman Bob Goodlatte 
(Apr. 10, 2017, 3:26 PM) (on file with author). 
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Constitution in the first place. Immediately after the reading 
concluded, the commentary began. Rep. Clyburn called the 
editing of the Constitution “revisionist history,”15 a senior vice 
president at the NAACP called it “sanitizing history,”16 and Rep. 
Jackson inserted lengthy critical remarks into the Congressional 
Record.17 Adam Serwer at the Washington Post argued that the 
“superceded text” helps “remind us that the Constitution . . . was 
not carved out of stone tablets by a finger of light,”18 while Adam 
White at the Weekly Standard said that “to call the three-fifths 
clause and other superseded provisions part of the current 
‘Constitution’ is silly.”19 Jack Balkin blogged that reading the 
whole Constitution would have been “a way of reminding 
ourselves that the Constitution is always a work in progress,”20 
and Matthew Franck at the National Review went further: “When 
parts of [the Constitution] are amended, or even explicitly 
repealed, they remain a part of the document . . . . They’re still 
there, and in a true copy of the Constitution, should not only be 
present, but should be unmarked by italics, brackets, or 
asterisks.”21 But what is a true copy of the Constitution? One that 
reflects all the provisions with legal force today—and only those 
provisions? One that includes every word added to the 
document—and not a single annotative word in addition? Or one 
that includes all the words—and notes (or, online, hyperlinks) to 
clarify what has been “superseded” or revised? 
The text of the Constitution is short, and every word 
matters—people notice when they are cut. But parts of this legal 
document are indeed legally inoperative, some more obviously 
than others. But which parts are they? Did Rep. Goodlatte pick 
the right ones; can anyone? Should we be paying more attention 
to these parts? How should we pay attention? Should they be 
legally “operative,” in any sense? 
Justice Scalia had a test for identifying plain meanings in 
debated words: Could you “use the word in that sense at a cocktail 
 
 15. Rucker & Fahrenthold, supra note 13. 
 16. Rucker & Fahrenthold, supra note 13. 
 17. READING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2. 
 18. Tobin Harshaw, The Constitution, Sort Of, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 7, 
2011), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/the-constitution-sort-of/?_r=0 
(compiling journalist and blogger reactions to the reading).  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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party without having people look at you funny”?22 Similarly, the 
rough test for which parts of the Constitution are really without 
legal force today would be: Could you rely on that clause in a 
court of law without having the judge look at you funny? 
Sometimes the answer is obvious: you cannot rely on the 
Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) in court. But other times 
the answer is not so clear: Could you rely on the Preamble’s 
guarantee of “the blessings of liberty”? Can you cite to the 1808 
clauses, or use the ratification dates in an argument? 
For such a short text,23 the number of frequently-skipped 
clauses is striking.  Rep. Goodlatte had his version of what should 
be ignored; the academy has its version.24 Constitutional law 
classes “have long had the same relation to the Constitution as the 
Elgin Marbles have to the Parthenon,”25 writes Mary Ann 
Glendon. “The student sees the professor’s prized collection of 
fragments, but the well-proportioned structure in which these 
treasures once had their appropriate place is nowhere on display.” 
The Supreme Court has warned us against this kind of blinkered 
approach to the document. Chief Justice Marshall declared in 
Marbury v. Madison, “It cannot be presumed that any clause in 
the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”26 Or in 
Sturges v. Crowninshield: “[E]very word and sentence was the 
subject of critical examination, and great deliberation.”27 And in 
Holmes v. Jennison: “[N]o word was unnecessarily used or 
needlessly added . . . . No word . . . can be rejected as superfluous 
or unmeaning . . . .”28 
 
 22. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 23. Akhil Amar’s America’s Unwritten Constitution refers to the document as a 
“terse text” forty-seven times. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION passim (2015). 
 24. Here it is worth making clear that, as useful descriptions of constitutional clauses, 
inoperative and ignored frequently overlap—but that is not always the case. Section 3 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is both legally inoperative today and frequently ignored. The 
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses are both operative and not ignored. Cases where 
these adjectives might diverge include the Three-Fifths Clause or the Eighteenth 
Amendment (Prohibition), which are legally inoperative today, but still frequently studied 
or discussed. Or the Bill of Attainder and Letters of Marque and Reprisal Clauses, which 
are both legally operative, but basically ignored today. Generally, the focus of this Article 
is on inoperative clauses (skipped by the Congressional readers, skipped by lawyers and 
judges, often skipped by scholars), though most of them are also ignored. 
 25. Mary Ann Glendon, Comment in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 111 (1997). 
 26. 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). 
 27. 17 U.S. 122, 133 (1819). 
 28. 39 U.S. 540, 570–71 (1840). 
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Even if there are parts of the Constitution without legal 
force, they should not be ignored. At minimum, we should study 
them to know where they are—and not just take Rep. Goodlatte’s 
word for which parts are operative and which are not. Every year, 
thousands of students and citizens encounter the Constitution for 
the first time—they need to be told which parts are still in force 
and which are not. But furthermore, they should be studied 
because maybe they are not entirely inoperative, after all. Maybe, 
in a laconic document like the Constitution, even phrases without 
legal force can be rich with meaning and utility. “The document is 
short,” writes David Strauss. “[E]ven shorter than it appears, if we 
leave out provisions that are never invoked today . . . .”29 But “we 
are in a better position to use the text as common ground if we 
can say that the whole Constitution is binding than we are if we 
routinely disregard parts of the Constitution and try to insist that 
only certain clauses are binding.”30 
To study these routinely disregarded parts, we must first, 
then, identify them. But then we must also categorize them. 
Otherwise we are left with “an arbitrary list, like random items on 
the menu of an eclectic restaurant.”31 Taxonomies help us “think 
intelligently about law.”32 If we can sort all the ignored provisions 
of the Constitution into categories—a taxonomy of irrelevancy—
then we can see which, if any, might still be useful to us today. 
Almost every clause that lacks legal force today can fit into 
one of four categories. The first is the category the House reading 
tried to identify: provisions that have been amended—repealed or 
revised by later additions to the Constitution. The second did not 
make the House’s cut-list, but may have as little legal force as 
amended items: lapsed clauses—clauses that have sunset through 
time or changed circumstances. The third is borrowed from 
literary theory: paratext,33 all the bits and pieces of text and style 
in and around the main text, which frame its reading or 
interpretation (introductions, titles, dates, formatting, etc.). The 
fourth category contains all the clauses that have been minimized, 
typically by judges but sometimes by other constitutional actors 
 
 29. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 7 (2010). 
 30. Id. at 111. 
 31. Tim Kaye, A Sound Taxonomy of Remedies, 36 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 79, 84 
(2017). 
 32. Emily Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, 15 LEGAL THEORY 25, 25 (2009). 
 33. See GERARD GENETTE, PARATEXTS: THRESHOLDS OF INTERPRETATION (Jane 
E. Lewin trans., 1997). 
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(the President, Congress)—clauses that might have held legal 
force (and might yet again) but for their narrow readings. These 
categories—amended, lapsed, paratext, and minimized—should 
be comprehensive. Scholars and citizens will continue to argue 
over which phrases fit into which categories, but all the clauses 
that might be inoperative should fit into at least one. 
Furthermore, like Philip Bobbitt’s typology of constitutional 
argument,34 this typology of constitutional irrelevancy serves 
more than just an organizational function. Each kind of 
irrelevancy is different—each has different implications for how 
the clauses should be studied, what force (interpretive, if not 
legal) they should have, and what might happen to them in the 
future. 
Returning to Mary Ann Glendon’s Parthenon metaphor 
might be helpful. Her argument for studying the whole building 
as opposed to just the prized fragments is an argument for holism: 
for studying the Constitution as a complete document, not as a 
collection of citable clauses. But even the holistic approach misses 
out on a focused approach to the supposedly irrelevant pieces. To 
study the Constitution—or the Parthenon—comprehensively, 
you need to study every element. Part of the history of the 
Parthenon is the fact that for a while, it was a mosque—Islamic 
minarets came up and went down over its long history. These are 
the amended parts of the building. Over centuries of construction 
and reconstruction, columns which once held weight are no longer 
actually serving a function, though they remain part of the 
structure. These are the lapsed parts of the building. There is 
visitor information—placards, posters, guides—all around the 
Parthenon; how you view it is inevitably shaped by these 
elements, though not literally part of the structure. This is the 
paratext surrounding the building. And finally, later 
preservationists and politicians have kept the building in a pristine 
white condition—even though it was probably brightly-painted in 
ancient times.35 This is how aspects of the building were 
minimized. You can study the building as a whole, or study the 
Elgin Marbles in isolation—but if you ignore all the other 
 
 34. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3–8 (1982) (outlining a “Typology of 
Constitutional Arguments”: historical, textual, structural, prudential, and doctrinal—and 
later in the text adding “ethical” to the list). 
 35. Chris Irvine, Parthenon Was Covered in Colourful Paint, TELEGRAPH, May 18, 
2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/5560715/Parthenon-
was-covered-in-colourful-paint.html. 
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fragments and pieces, the parts you were told do not matter, the 
parts you thought you could skip—you would be missing 
something important. 
Two final notes before examining each of the four categories 
of constitutional irrelevancy. First, the Supreme Court cannot 
help us here. If the one thing these clauses have in common is that 
they are without legal force today, then they will not—by 
definition—usually form the basis of a justiciable case or 
controversy. Perhaps they might be glanced at in dicta, but we are 
unlikely to ever have a holding that articulates the meaning and 
use of the Confederate Debt Clause, or state legislature elections 
of Senators. The important exception is for minimized clauses: 
what the Court has done, the Court can undo, and a minimized 
clause might very well be brought back to life. 
Second: why are there legally inoperative phrases in a legal 
document, anyway? After all, the states typically edit their 
constitutions when they amend them;36 why does the U.S. 
Constitution just keep growing? As it turns out, there was nothing 
inevitable about the expanding-list style of the Constitution. 
James Madison, as part of the first Congress, suggested that the 
first amendments be interwoven into the text—he even had 
locations picked out for each one.37 He was outvoted by 
supporters of Roger Sherman’s proposal: that the amendments be 
tacked on lest the “whole fabric”38 of the document be destroyed. 
“We might as well endeavor to mix brass, iron and clay, as to 
incorporate such heterogeneous articles,” Sherman argued. 
Madison disagreed—foreshadowing the exact problem that 
would later result in the criticism of Congress’s edited reading: 
“[I]t will be difficult to ascertain to what parts of the instrument 
the amendments particular refer,” he wrote. “[T]he question will 
often arise and sometimes not be easily solved, how far the 
original text is or is not necessarily superceded, by the 
supplemental act.”39 
One scholar has suggested that Madison’s decision to give in 
to Sherman’s argument rested on as historically contingent a fact 
as that the summer was incredibly hot in 1789, and the 
 
 36. AMAR, supra note 23, at 468. 
 37. Edward Hartnett, A ‘Uniform and Entire’ Constitution; or, What if Madison Had 
Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252 (1997). 
 38. Id. at 253. 
 39. Id. at 254, 258. 
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Representatives were restless.40 Perhaps we owe the 
“archaeological feel”41 of the amended-not-edited Constitution to 
a heat wave. In any case, that same scholar, Edward Hartnett, 
tried to recreate Madison’s “Uniform and Entire” Constitution, 
by interweaving the twenty-seven amendments to the 
Constitution into the body of the text, and by deleting the parts 
that had been superseded.42 Perhaps not surprisingly, the result of 
this effort to create a Constitution as it operates today looks very 
different from Rep. Goodlatte’s efforts at the same project. 
Which parts really are irrelevant, and what we are supposed to do 
with them, turn out to be hard questions, after all. 
II. AMENDED 
The House reading of the Constitution attempted to edit out 
what had been amended.43 They left in all the other forms of 
legally force-less elements: the lapsed parts (Rep. Israel reading 
about Confederate debt obligations)44, the paratext (Rep. Fincher 
letting us know when the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was 
proposed and ratified)45, and the minimized parts (Rep. Rigell 
reading the “privileges or immunities” clause46).47 To be fair, the 
parts that have been amended make up the most obvious category 
of constitutional irrelevancy. But what is not obvious is the full 
extent of what should be included in this category, what tools are 
most useful in analyzing amended clauses, and what interpretative 
force or guidance we can draw from them. 
Each of the categories of irrelevancy can be further divided 
into two types: amended provisions, for instance, can either have 
been amended directly or indirectly. Direct amendment happens 
when a later provision (e.g. the Twenty-First Amendment) 
explicitly refers to the part that it is revising (e.g. the Eighteenth 
 
 40. Id. at 256–58. 
 41. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 292, note (1998). 
 42. Hartnett, supra note 37, at 284–99. 
 43. Breeding, supra note 14 (“Members read the Constitution as amended.”). 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
 45. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 2, at H61 (“Amendment 27, originally 
proposed September 25, 1789; ratified May 7, 1992”). 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 47. Accepting, for the moment, David Strauss’s argument that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause has indeed been minimized into irrelevancy: “[I]t is hard to say that a 
position that has been consistently and explicitly rejected by the courts is still the law.” 
David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1551 (reviewing 
AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2015)). 
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Amendment). Or when a later provision directly revises an earlier 
part of the Constitution (even without referring to it by name—as 
when the Twelfth and then the Twentieth Amendments revised 
the Article II system for presidential election). Indirect, or 
implicit, amendment requires an extra step: for instance, the 
amendment changes something which then affects an earlier 
provision.48 An example might be the Three-Fifths Clause itself. 
The Thirteenth Amendment did not change the Apportionment 
Clause of Article I—it abolished slavery, which left no one to be 
counted as three-fifths. These implicit amendments—or implied 
repeals—make the exact boundaries of the amended category 
controversial. One of the reasons Congress’s edited Constitution 
did not match Edward Hartnett’s edited Constitution is that 
legitimate disagreements over the existence or extent of implicit 
amendments can—and do—exist. That, again, was precisely 
Madison’s fear regarding an amended (not edited) document. 
But in any case, what is to be done with implicitly or explicitly 
amended clauses, once we identify them? How should they be 
read or used? One sensible approach—here and for all the parts 
we skip—would be to analyze these clauses in the same way we 
analyze the operative parts of the Constitution. That is, we could 
apply the standard tools of constitutional interpretation or 
argumentation to these clauses, and see what—if anything—
results. Philip Bobbitt’s six modalities of constitutional 
interpretation are probably the most famous of these tools, but we 
could use any such list.49 We could use Jack Balkin’s recently 
 
 48. There is, however, a canon of statutory interpretation suggesting a presumption 
against “implied repeals.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, 
AND INTERPRETATION 568 (2014) (describing “The Presumption Against Implied 
Repeals”); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“In the absence of some 
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal 
by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable”) (citing Georgia v. 
Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456–457 (1945)). Justice Scalia argued that this canon 
should apply even more forcefully to constitutional interpretation. See Antonin Scalia, 
Response in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 141 (1997) (“If the 
Constitution, intended to be a more permanent document, should be treated at all 
differently [from statutes] insofar as amendments are concerned, one would think that, if 
anything, the normal rule of construction that repeals by implication are disfavored would 
be more rigorously applied.”) (citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503–05 
(1936)). But see Akhil Amar, Introduction to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION (forthcoming ed.) (arguing that the Constitution has “no detailed 
instructions about how extensively to reinterpret earlier clauses in light of later 
amendments. Nowhere does the intergenerational text itself say that ‘repeals by 
implication are disfavored’ or anything close to that”). 
 49. BOBBITT, supra note 34. 
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proposed eleven topoi instead, for instance.50 His topoi, or 
topics—like Bobbitt’s modalities—are simply “shared tools for 
solving problems and inventing persuasive arguments.”51 Can we 
use the standard tools of constitutional argument to solve the 
problem of supposedly-skippable clauses? Can we use these tools 
to invent persuasive arguments about what those clauses can do? 
Some of the best tools for analyzing the amended clauses are 
probably the structural, historical, and ethical modalities. Each of 
these modalities is particularly well-suited to squeezing meaning 
or interpretive force out of parts of the document that have been 
specifically rejected or revised. Together, they ask: how has the 
document (and the country) reshaped itself? How has it evolved? 
What commitments or practices have we abandoned; what 
projects have we repeatedly returned to? The final chapters of 
Akhil Amar’s America’s Constitution: A Biography52 and 
America’s Unwritten Constitution53 both engage in this exercise. 
They look for trends in the amendments, evidence of what kinds 
of clauses have been repealed over the course of American 
history. This is a historical project (telling the story of America 
and the Constitution through its amendments), a structural 
project (revealing, for instance, the ways in which individual rights 
have expanded, or how the country has shifted from federalism 
towards nationalism), and an ethical project (trying to understand 
the American project through the topics “We” keep coming back 
to). Needless to say, none of this rich material would exist if the 
Constitution simply edited out the amended parts. While each 
amended item on its own might not have serious interpretative 
force, and none of them have any legal force, together they tell an 
impressive tale: there are significant themes, American leitmotifs, 
in the collected amended clauses. 
Another way to read the amended parts is intertextually, in 
the same way we look to the Articles of Confederation or colonial 
constitutions for interpretive guidance. Those charters, just like 
the amended parts of the Constitution, were rejected. But 
examining these early drafts in American constitutionalism helps 
 
 50. Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145 (2018) (proposing text, structure, purpose, 
consequences, judicial precedent, customs, natural law or rights, national ethos, political 
tradition, and honored authority as the eleven tools of constitutional argumentation). 
 51. Id. at 89. 
 52. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 458–63 (2005). 
 53. AMAR, supra note 23, at 449–77. 
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us understand the current document. How can the powers given 
to the Confederation’s Congress help us understand the powers 
given to the Constitution’s Congress? How can the state bills of 
rights help us understand the scope of the federal Bill of Rights? 
These are intertextual questions, and they can be asked as 
fruitfully of the amended clauses as they can of these outside-the-
Constitution texts. Should the amendment of the Three-Fifths 
and Fugitive Slave clauses guide our reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause? Should the revisions of the election methods 
for Senators and Presidents guide our understanding of current 
voting schemes? Should the expanding classes of people who can 
vote for (and run for) President guide our understanding of 
current voting rights issues or case law? Perhaps these are really 
intra- not inter-textual questions.54 But that hinges on whether 
you consider the amended parts to be part of our Constitution or 
not, which citizens, scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians can 
and clearly do disagree on. 
A final method for reading the amended clauses is through 
the theory of the anticanon.55 The anticanon typically describes 
the constitutional law cases most reviled or rejected today: Dred 
Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu, for example.56 They are 
“paradigmatic examples of what is not the law . . . . They inhabit 
the same level of symbolic importance as Marbury and 
McCulloch, but are cautionary tales rather than heroic ones.”57 
Perhaps, then, the amended portions of the Constitution can be 
read in a similar way: just as important (symbolically) as the rest 
of the text, but as paradigmatic examples of what the Constitution 
is not. 
Towards the project of a comprehensive list of constitutional 
irrelevancy, here, then, are the clauses that might fit in this 
category, with a few notes on how some of them have been or 






 54. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
 55. Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 
(1998). 
 56. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011). 
 57. Primus, supra note 55, at 245. 
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Table 1. The Amended Constitution 
 
Clause Amended By Possible Uses 
   
Article I, Section 2, Clause 
iii: “three fifths of all other 
Persons” 
Indirectly 








guided by historical and 
ethical arguments. The 
Constitution (and the 
country) repudiates its 
slavocratic origins and 
celebrates its abolitionist 
reconstruction. 
   
Article IV, Section 2, 
Clause iii: “No Person held 
to Service or Labour in one 
State” 
Directly amended 
by the Thirteenth 
Amendment 
Same as above. 
   
Article I, Section 3, Clause 






Structural and ethical 
arguments: the Constitu-
tion has moved from a 
more state-focused, fed-
eralist structure to a 
more nationalist self-
conception. 
   
Article I, Section 3, Clause 
ii: “if Vacancies happen . . . 






Same as above. 
   
Article I, Section 4, Clause 
ii: “first Monday in Decem-
ber” 
Directly amended 
by the Twentieth 
Amendment 
 
   
Article I, Section 9, Clause 
iv: “No Capitation, or other 
direct, Tax” 
Directly amended 
by the Twentieth 
Amendment 
 
   
Article II, Section 1, Clause 
iii “The Electors” 
Directly amended 
by the Twelfth 
Amendment 
Structural and historical 
arguments—the presi-
dential election and suc-
cession systems are 
deeply flawed. They re-
quire constant tinkering. 
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Article II, Section 1, Clause 
vi: “In case of the Removal 




Same as above. 
   
The Twelfth Amendment Directly amended 
by the Twentieth 
Amendment 
Same as above. 
   
Article III, Section 2, 
Clause i “between a State 
and Citizens of another 
State” 
Directly amended 
by the Eleventh 
Amendment 
 
   
The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Section 2: “male in-
habitants of such State, be-
ing twenty-one years of 
age” 
Indirectly 




The franchise has only 
grown throughout 
American history, repre-
senting an expanding 
American conception of 
who is included in “We 
the People.”58 








Lapsed clauses are those which had legal force, but do not 
any longer—though they were never amended or repealed. They 
come in two types: clauses which have lapsed through time (sunset 
provisions) or through changed circumstances (the original 
conditions the clause refers to have disappeared). Sunset 
provisions are more obvious—when the document refers to a 
clause only having force until 1808,59 or requiring ratification 
“within seven years,”60 it is clear that in 1809, or seven years after 
the amendment was proposed, that clause has no more legal force. 
Changed-circumstance lapsed clauses are more interesting: what 
conditions in America have changed permanently? An example 
might be Article VI, Section 1, Clause i: “All Debts contracted 
 
 58. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 52, at 461. For the argument that the Nineteenth and 
Twenty-Sixth Amendments indirectly amended the Fourteenth Amendment, see AMAR, 
supra note 23, at 188. For the argument that the Nineteenth Amendment implicitly 
amended Article II and the Twelfth Amendment (women could now vote for, serve as an 
Elector for, and run for President) see id. at 287–88. 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.; U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 60. U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, § 3; XX, § 6; XXI, § 3; XXII § 2. 
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and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this 
Constitution, as under the Confederation.” No amendment ever 
repealed this clause of the Constitution, and it does not have a 
time-based sunset provision. But, as the United States paid off its 
obligations under the Articles of Confederation, the clause 
eventually lapsed. It refers to a condition—outstanding 
Confederation debt—that no longer exists, and never will again. 
Unlike the amended clauses, lapsed clauses therefore have a 
vestigial quality to them. Clauses that were amended have been—
at least during one other point in American history—on the 
forefront of political conversation; an Article V supermajority 
decided to change them. Lapsed clauses simply stopped doing 
anything (legally) on their own; they petered out. It is hard to 
imagine a lapsed clause ever becoming a high-salience enough 
political issue to prompt an Article V amendment. As a result, 
they pose an interpretive puzzle: these clauses have never been 
repudiated, but they probably never will be. How much attention 
should we give them? 
The answer is probably more than they have received; the 
lapsed clauses seem particularly under-theorized in constitutional 
scholarship. Luckily, there are existing constitutional interpretive 
theories which seem applicable to the lapsed-clause category. In 
terms of the constitutional modalities, textual and structural 
arguments seem best-suited to unpacking lapsed clauses, as does 
their close cousin, the intratextual method. In addition, the 
historical modality works well here, especially as applied through 
Jed Rubenfeld’s “Paradigm Case” model61 and Jack Balkin’s 
“Original Expected Application” model.62 
The intratextualism method allows “the interpreter . . . to 
read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution 
in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same 
(or a very similar) word or phrase.”63 This, at a minimum, seems 
like a good use for lapsed clauses. They may not be any more 
Confederation debt,64 or Confederacy debt,65 but there is still U.S. 
 
 61. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 16–17 (2005). 
 62. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6–20 (2011). 
 63. Amar, supra note 54, at 748. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1. 
 65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
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national debt66—and it can still be a contested constitutional 
issue.67 Why not read the Constitution’s use and understanding of 
(still legally relevant) debt against its use of the exact same word 
in other (no longer legally relevant) parts of the document? 
Intratextualism “takes seriously the document as a whole rather 
than as a jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses.”68 A taxonomy of 
constitutional irrelevancy has the same mission, and the two 
projects can serve each other. 
A more radical use of the lapsed clauses would be to draw 
from them substantive interpretative conclusions about the 
Constitution and its principles. The Constitution deals with 
Confederate soldiers, repudiates Confederate debt, and refuses to 
compensate slave-owners after emancipation.69 All of these 
clauses have lapsed; they do not and cannot apply to anyone alive 
today. But perhaps we can draw from them a constitutional 
principle, a commitment to the cause of union and freedom—and 
a concomitant rejection of all the Confederacy stood for. “The 
Lost Cause”—and relics of Confederate memory—still haunt this 
country;70 is there a constitutional principle specifically rejecting 
the Southern cause built into these lapsed clauses?71 
This line of questioning is a sort of reverse-engineered 
version of Rubenfeld’s Paradigm Cases, or Balkin’s Original 
Expected Applications. To Rubenfeld, “[t]he point of 
constitutional law is to hold the nation to its self-given, 
fundamental commitments over time . . . .”72 The Constitution 
often speaks in general principles, or commitments, and one way 
we elucidate the meaning of those commitments is through the 
“paradigm cases”—the core examples—underlying the principle. 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Garrett Epps, Our National Debt ‘Shall Not Be Questioned,’ the Constitution 
Says, ATLANTIC, May 4, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/our-
national-debt-shall-not-be-questioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (discussing the “debt 
ceiling crisis” in terms of constitutional terms). 
 68. Amar, supra note 54, at 795. 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 3, 4. 
 70. See, e.g., Sharlene Sinegal Decuir, Opinion, Good Riddance to Confederate 
Monuments, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/opinion/
good-riddance-to-confederate-monuments.html?_r=0. See generally DAVID W. BLIGHT, 
RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2002). 
 71. See Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Constitution of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS L.J. 639, 645 (2019) (“[One] might put Section 3 to 
creative use in debates over whether to maintain monuments to Confederate 
notables . . . .”). 
 72. RUBENFELD, supra note 61, at 15. 
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(For instance, the Equal Protection Clause through the Black 
Codes). Lapsed clauses present us with the reverse situation: a 
paradigm case, without a general commitment. Jack Balkin also 
argues that the Constitution often speaks in broad principles, 
applied to specific concerns. His “Living Originalism” demands 
fidelity to the Original Meaning, if not to the Original 
Application.73 But again, what if we only have an original 
application (Confederate soldiers and debt) but no explicit 
original principle? Should we infer the principle from the 
application? Infer the commitment from the paradigm case? 
There is a good argument from negative implication that the 
framers of the Constitution or its amendments deliberately left 
out the general commitment. Therefore, it would be destructive 
to the text to infer a principle that was specifically left out. “[A] 
negative-implication argument,” however, “should never be 
decisive absent additional, fine-grained reasons to support its 
application in a given situation.”74 Unless we have a historical or 
structural or logical reason to assume that, for instance, the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would reject a principle 
against supporting the debt (read broadly) of a sectional, caste-
based cause, we should be able to read that principle into the text. 
This principle would lend constitutional weight to arguments 
against Confederate memorials or memorabilia. 
This is not a watertight argument; generalizations from 
paradigm cases never are: “Reasoning from paradigm cases is a 
variegated business—incorporating considerations of text, policy, 
and justice . . . . Paradigm cases do not dictate unique answers to 
most constitutional questions.”75 Perhaps a less historically and 
culturally loaded example might help clarify the “lapsed clause as 
paradigm case” model. The Seventh Amendment requires juries 
for civil trials when “the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars . . . .”76 The first Judiciary Act, almost contemporaneous 
with the Seventh Amendment, established a financial minimum 
for federal diversity jurisdiction at five hundred dollars77 (today it 
 
 73. BALKIN, supra note 62, at 12–14. 
 74. AMAR, supra note 23, at 538 n.1. 
 75. RUBENFELD, supra note 61, at 17. 
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 77. Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73, Chap. XX § 
11 (1789). 
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is $75,000).78 As a result, the Twenty Dollars Clause has never 
been invoked, and indeed, it has rarely even been studied. 
Not unusually for a lapsed clause, “no writer has analyzed the 
Amendment’s [Twenty Dollar] clause,” and “many have not even 
bothered to include the Twenty Dollars Clause when quoting the 
Amendment . . . .”79 The Harvard Law Review Note that 
attempted to remedy this situation ended up analyzing the 
provision in precisely the “lapsed clause as paradigm case” 
manner. Rather than write off the never-used, hardly-studied 
clause as irrelevant, the author found a general principal in the 
lapsed clause: the convergence of property and liberty in the 
Framers’ philosophy. Twenty dollars represents “a de minimis 
conception of property.”80 To the Framers, some amount of 
property must be at stake for liberty to truly be at stake—and to 
therefore require a liberty-protecting jury. It does not matter that 
the amount-in-controversy requirement has always been set 
higher than the constitutional minimum; “what’s important is that 
the amount is not set at zero.”81 Whether you accept that author’s 
conclusion (that the Twenty Dollars Clause constitutionally 
embodies a Founding property-liberty philosophy), it is a nice 
demonstration of how to argue with lapsed clauses. 
Better, perhaps, than arguing only from lapsed clauses would 
be to use lapsed clauses in support of an argument based in more 
typically-litigated clauses. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry did 
something like this in their 1996 defense of Romer v. Evans.82 
They use the Bill of Attainder Clause—along with the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause—to elaborate a “Pariah Principle” 
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. That is, they press two 
lesser-used clauses into service understanding a more frequently 
litigated clause. Or, to return to the Twenty Dollar example. 
Maybe that lapsed clause is not enough to litigate a property-
liberty connection embodied in the Constitution. But in an 
eminent domain or asset-forfeiture case, perhaps an invocation of 
the Constitution’s liberty-property principle (see the lapsed 
Twenty Dollar Clause) could be of service.83 
 
 78. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). 
 79. Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1665–66 (2005). 
 80. Id. at 1685. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 
257 (1996). 
 83. In this way, lapsed-clause arguments could perhaps work as interpretive 
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A final question from this category: what about clauses like 
the Third Amendment, which have never been amended but have 
also never really been used in court?84 These clauses may seem 
vestigial, like lapsed clauses, but they differ significantly. The 
Third Amendment can and will have legal force if the 
circumstances it refers to—quartering soldiers—ever arise. 
(Witness the late-blooming career of the Emoluments Clause, for 
example.85) They are “dormant,” more than they are “lapsed.” 
Lapsed clauses are those on which time or history has closed the 
door for good. Some clauses may walk the line between dormant 
and lapsed: they depend on the interpreter’s predictions about the 
future. If the interpreter is convinced that soldiers will never be 
quartered in American homes, then the Third Amendment would 
indeed be lapsed, not dormant. Another edge case might be the 
convention mechanism of Article V—it has never been used, and 
maybe it never will be, but could it? A final clause that seems 
lapsed but is not: Article I, Section 3, Clause ii, dividing the first 
group of Senators into three classes, two of which did not get six-
year terms. While at first it would seem like this clause lapsed after 
the third Congress, “the Senate has in every instance of a new 
state’s admission followed a practice . . . [in which] senators from 
new states have served initial terms of less than six years . . . .”86 
An attempt at a comprehensive list of clauses that are lapsed 




“tiebreakers,” or presumptions, rather than determinative arguments on their own. See 
generally Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1661 (2010). 
 84. The closest the Third Amendment has ever gotten to the Supreme Court was 
Engblom v. Carey, 724 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1982). See also ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE 
KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE 107 (1991) (“Between one of the most controversial 
amendments, the Second, and one of the most heavily litigated, the Fourth, is the forgotten 
amendment.”). See also Graber, supra note 71, at 20 (describing the Third Amendment—
as well as Congress’s power to grant letters of marque and reprisal—as “anachronisms” 
and part of his “Constitution of Memory”). 
 85. D.C. & Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596 (pending). In other words, the 
clauses analyzed in this Article are all without legal force, not just unused. Conventionally, 
a lawyer or judge cannot use an amended clause, a lapsed clause, a minimized clause 
(without advocating for a change in doctrine), or paratext. Dormant clauses—like the 
Emoluments Clause—are more like Justice Jackson’s “loaded weapon,” which “lies 
about” waiting for a “plausible claim” to fit. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 213, 246 
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 86. AMAR, supra note 23, at 350. 
1 - BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:34 PM 
242 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:323 
 
 




Article 1, Section 2, Clause iii: “The 
Number of Representatives shall not 
exceed one for every thirty Thousand” 
Is this clause lapsed or dormant? It 
depends whether you believe it is 
ever conceivable that the House 
could swell to its constitutional max-
imum, which today would be more 
than 10,000 Representatives. 
  
Article I, Section 2, Clause iii “the 
State of New Hampshire shall be enti-
tled to chuse three, Massachusetts 
eight, Rhode-Island . . .” 
Lapsed after the first census and re-
sulting reapportionment. 
  
Article I, Section 9, Clause i: “prior to 
the Year one thousand eight hundred 
and eight” 
Illustrating the constitutional use of 
sunset (lapsed-by-time) provisions.87 
 
  
Article V, Section 1, Clause i: “no 
Amendment which may be made prior 
to the Year One thousand eight hun-
dred and eight” 
Same as above. 
  
Article II, Section 1, Clause v: “No 
Person except a natural born Citizen, 
or a Citizen of the United States at the 
time of the Adoption of this Constitu-
tion, shall be eligible to the Office of 
President . . . .” (emphasis added) 
This clause would have lapsed when 
the last citizen-child from 1789, who 
had not been a citizen at birth, 
passed away, perhaps some time in 
the late 1800s. 
  
The Seventeenth Amendment: “shall 
not . . . affect the election or term of 
any Senator chosen before it becomes 
valid” 
Lapsed one full Senate 
term after ratification. 
  
 
 87. Sunset provisions being common in legislation, occasional in the Constitution, 
and rare in judicial doctrine (as in Grutter’s famous “twenty-five year” sunset provision). 
For more on this topic—especially jurisprudential sunsets, see David Schraub, 
DOCTRINAL SUNSETS (2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3317213 (“[T]he 
United States’ constitutional text contains several sunset provisions . . . [y]et scholars have 
not systematically explored the utility of incorporating sunset clauses into constitutional 
or judicial doctrine.”). 
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The Twenty-Second Amendment, 
Section 1: “shall not apply to any per-
son holding the office of President 
when this Article was proposed” 
Lapsed after Harry S. Truman left 
office. This clause, along with the 
Seventeenth Amendment and Art. 
II, § 1, cl. 5, above, all make excep-
tions for people who may have had 
or relied on pre-rule expectations of 
presidential, congressional, or term-
limit eligibility. These lapsed clauses 
are perhaps paradigmatic cases for 
an unspoken constitutional principle 
analogous to criminal law’s pre-
sumption against retroactivity. Con-
stitutional rules should be read to 
apply going forward, only. Or: the 
Constitution is sensitive to reliance 
interests. 
  
Article VI, Section 1, Clause i: “All 
Debts contracted . . . before the Adop-
tion of this Constitution” 
 
  
Article VII, Section 1, Clause i: “The 
Ratification of the Conventions of 
nine States” 
Lapsed once the Constitution was 
ratified. Lapsed clauses can signal 
or highlight especially significant 
historical political moments or pro-
cesses.88 This lapsed clause is a re-
minder to pay attention to the (re-
markable) ratification process to 
understand the Constitution bet-
ter.89 
  




The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 
3: “engaged in insurrection or rebel-
lion” 
Lapsed after the death of the last 
Confederate veteran or supporter.90 
There is an argument to be made 
that this section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is actually dormant, 
not lapsed. It refers to “insurrection 
 
 88. See also Graber, supra note 71, at 11 (arguing Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment embodied a temporary political imperative: securing power for the 
Republican party). 
 89. See AMAR, supra note 23, at 49-94. 
 90. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING 
CERTAINTY (2002) (“The Reconstruction Congress focused not on § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment —which contains the clauses most relevant today, but on §§ 2 and 3, which 
essentially expired within a few years.” [sic—sections 3 and 4 seem more applicable].). 
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or rebellion,” not specifically the 
Confederate rebellion of 1860-65. 
Theoretically, if there were ever an-
other insurrection or rebellion in 
the United States, this section could 
have legal force once more.91 
  
The Eighteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-
First, and Twenty-Second Amend-
ments: “This article shall be inopera-
tive unless it shall have been ratified . . 
. within seven years” 
 
  
Twentieth Amendment, Section 5: 
“shall take effect on the 15th day of 






The literary theorist Gerard Genette coined the helpful term 
paratext to refer to all the “devices and conventions, both within 
and outside the book, that form part of the complex mediation 
between book, author, publisher, and reader: titles, forewords, 
epigraphs,” and the like.92 These mechanisms for presenting or 
explaining the text are not without impact. They are, in fact, 
“Thresholds of Interpretation”93—the first items that shape our 
understanding of a text. It is common to treat any text—perhaps 
especially the Constitution— as “essential and unchanging,” 
unaffected by the “insignificant container” that is its physical 
 
 91. Without seriously getting into the likelihood of this occurring, it is worth noting 
that civil war is on some scholarly and artistic minds. See Sandy Levinson, Why Professor 
Marcus’s Arguments Don’t Convince Me, BALKINIZATION, Mar. 30, 2017, 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/03/why-professor-marcuss-arguments-dont.html (“I 
think we are on the brink of civil war.”); see also Michiko Kakutani, A Haunting Debut 
Looks Ahead to a Second American Civil War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/books/review-american-war-omar-el-akkad.html 
(reviewing Omar El Akkad’s debut novel AMERICAN WAR, which “recounts what 
happened during the Second American Civil War . . . It is a story that extrapolates the 
deep, partisan divisions that already plague American politics”). 
 92. GENETTE, supra note 33, at front matter. 
 93. Id., at subtitle. 
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presentation.94 But of course, “no text exists outside of the 
support that enables it to be read; any comprehension of a writing 
. . . depends on the forms in which it reaches its reader.”95 To move 
from literary theory to legal scholarship: Jack Balkin has 
elucidated the ways in which “the seemingly meaningless and 
accidental features of a text possess an economy or logic that both 
troubles and elucidates other features of the text.”96 His extended 
treatment of a particular kind of paratext—the legal footnote—
demonstrates how the “surface features of the text . . . and the 
meaning or argument or point of the text are not separable . . . .” 
They “feed upon and nourish each other in a most uncanny 
way.”97 
Paratextual elements of the Constitution can be divided into 
two groups: those that were included by the framers and ratifiers, 
and those that are included by later editors and publishers.98 
Examples of the first might include the Attestation and Signature 
Clauses of the Constitution. Examples of the second might 
include the footnotes and format (including size) of the 
Constitution as published. Paratext almost certainly contains no 
legal force—it is constitutionally irrelevant in that regard. 
“[J]ustice should not be the handmaiden of grammar . . . .”99 Even 
less so should justice be the handmaiden of typography. “For 
almost all legal purposes, the variance of punctuation and 
capitalization . . . should make no difference . . . . Sensible readers 
should hesitate to place great weight on syntactical specks and 
grammatical nits . . . .”100 Certainly; so why pay attention to the 
size, the notes, the dates, or the formatting? Because they 
influence how the document is read, and understood—and 
ultimately that influences what it means. Unlike a typical statute, 
the Constitution is a truly public document,101 and if the paratext 
 
 94. EVELYN B. TRIBBLE, MARGINS AND MARGINALITY 1 (1993). 
 95. Roger Chartier, Texts, Printing, Readings, in THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY 161 
(Lynn Hunt ed., 1989). 
 96. J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. L. REV. 275, 275 (1989). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Genette uses the term “official” to refer to the former category, and “unofficial” 
or “semiofficial” for the latter. GENETTE, supra note 33, at 9–10. 
 99. ESKRIDGE, supra note 48, at 458 (quoting Value Oil Co. v. Irvington, 377 A.2d 
1225, 1231 (N.J. Super. 1977)). 
 100. AMAR, supra note 23, at 68. 
 101. See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937) 
(“The Constitution of the United States was a layman’s document, not a lawyer’s contract. 
That cannot be stressed too often.”). 
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influences how the public interprets the Constitution, then the 
constitutional paratext is worth studying. 
Indeed, the public understanding of the document can trickle 
into the scholarly and legal understanding of the document. David 
Cole, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, has 
argued that constitutional change comes “from the ground up” 
not “from the top down.”102 That is, from citizen-understandings, 
not (or not only) from judges. Mark Tushnet, among others,103 has 
described how popular understandings of the constitution’s 
meaning can spread into political coalitions—and from political 
coalitions to legal actors.104 Or they can even skip the political 
parties, as when social movements directly influence legal 
reasoning.105 The public encounters the document through the 
filter of its paratext, and the publicly-encountered document 
eventually does become the legally-relevant document. 
In general, the textual modality is going to be the most 
appropriate tool for paratextual analysis: what the text means is 
influenced by what it looks like, what surrounds it. The historical 
modality will also often be helpful—many of the Constitution’s 
paratextual elements (the Framers’ signatures, the ratification 
dates) are the most history-highlighting elements of the 
document. Indeed, “historical awareness of the period which saw 
the birth of a work is rarely a matter of indifference when reading 
it.”106 
This is especially true of the Constitution, which positions 
itself as a multi-generational document grounded in American 
history. When scholars like Akhil Amar examine the significance 
of how “[e]ach discrete amendment bears a precise date that 
 
 102. David Cole, Engines of Liberty, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY BLOG 
(Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/?post_type=acsblog&p=11427. 
 103. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Legal Scholarship Symposium: The Scholarship of 
Sanford Levinson: Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA 
L. REV. 553, 567 (2003) (“the practice of politics can shift the boundaries of what is on the 
wall and off the wall” in constitutional interpretation); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: 
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
 104. Mark V. Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 991, 998 (2006). 
 105. Id. at 999 (“Judges observing the social movement . . . change their views about 
what the Constitution means.”). But see See Ben Johnson & Logan Strother, Does the 
Supreme Court Respond to Public Opinion? (Oct. 6, 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3261668. 
 106. Gerard Genette, Introduction to the Paratext, 22:2 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 261, 
256 (Marie Maclean trans., 1991). 
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locates its message within the broader saga of American 
history,”107 they are engaging in paratextual analysis. The 
ratification dates for every amendment, included in almost every 
edition of the Constitution, are not literally part of the 
amendments’ text. (How could they be? The early ratifiers of each 
amendment had no idea when the ratification would be 
complete.) And yet that outside-the-text (paratextual) 
information inevitably shapes one’s reading of the text—often 
significantly: “[W]e need only see the date 1868 alongside the 
Fourteenth Amendment to understand its underlying impulse.”108 
The dates of the amendments are what tell the reader to think of 
the first ten amendments as part of the Founding generation. To 
see amendments thirteen through fifteen as part of America’s 
Reconstruction. To recognize the triumphs (women’s suffrage) 
and failures (Prohibition) or a particular, progressive era. 
Arguments about the order, relative length, or placement of 
clauses are also paratextual. “The textual order of the 
Constitution’s first three articles made both conceptual and 
democratic sense,” for instance.109 In other words, the fact that the 
legislative article is “first,” or that the judicial article is “third” 
should be read as democracy-affirming.110 A similar argument is 
made by the refrain, “The First Amendment is first for a 
reason”—repeated by politicians111 and journalists112 alike. Of 
 
 107. AMAR, supra note 52, at 459. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 208. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671 (2002) 
(making extended arguments about the Constitution’s meaning from its “size and shape”). 
 110. See, e.g., Press Release, Ben Sasse, Sasse on Kavanaugh Hearing: ‘We Can and 
Should Do Better Than This’ (Sept. 4, 2018) (on file with author), 
https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9/sasse-on-kavanaugh-hearing-we-
can-and-we-should-do-better-than-this (“The Constitution’s drafters began with the 
legislature. These are equal branches, but Article I comes first for a reason . . . .”). See also 
AMAR, supra note 109, at 693 (drawing meaning from the fact that “the Constitution lists 
the judiciary third among the three great departments”); RICHARD BEEMAN, THE 
PENGUIN GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 47 (2010) (“Just as the framers 
of the Constitution considered the Congress to be the most vital branch of the new 
government and therefore dealt with that branch in the very first article of the 
Constitution, so too was the placement of the judicial branch in Article III of the 
Constitution a reflection of their view of the relative importance of that branch.”). 
 111. UNITED STATES SENATE, 104th Cong., HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS ACT 141, 
S18063 (COMM PRINT 1995) (“the first amendment is first for a reason.”) (statement of 
Sen. Bumpers); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 110th Cong., FREE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION ACT OF 2007 153, H11593 (“The first amendment is first for a reason.”) 
(statement of Rep. Poe). 
 112. Ed Pilkington, New York Times’s Jill Abramson: ‘The First Amendment is First 
for a Reason’, GUARDIAN, Oct. 13, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/13/
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course, the First Amendment is first rather than third only 
because two of Madison’s proposed amendments were not 
immediately ratified.113 Clearly, then, the “Firstness of the First 
Amendment”114 argument is purely paratextual—reading 
significance from an artifact of timing and formatting, not 
intention or drafting. 
The size, price, annotations, and headings in and around the 
text also influence one’s reading—but here we run into a serious 
problem: which edition of the Constitution should we look at? 
While the core text does not typically vary from copy to copy, the 
paratext can significantly. Editions of the Constitution vary in 
size, in whether or how they include ratification dates, in whether 
they include other documents around or within the Constitution 
(the “Preamble” to the Bill of Rights, the Convention Resolution, 
the Declaration of Independence), in whether they include 
footnotes or annotations, in whether they include bracketed or 
italicized text to indicate repeals or amendments, and much more. 
To take just one example: the printed LexisNexis edition of 
the Constitution—handed out free to future lawyers, judges, and 
legal scholars—is full of content-influencing paratext. Each clause 
is titled, such as Article I, Section 8, Clause 8: “Patents and 
copyrights,” or Article III, Section 2, Clause 3: “Trial by jury.” 
Those examples are relatively innocuous, but others can 
significantly alter the text. For example, to call Article IV, Section 
2, Clause 3 “Runaway slaves”—in the document—is to 
specifically add a word to the Constitution that the Framers bent 
over backwards to avoid. Their avoidance is historically and 
structurally significant. Casually pulling back the curtain on those 
efforts adds honesty and clarity to a text that was deliberately 
being obscure or evasive. Or the Second Amendment, here titled 
“Right to bear arms.” By selecting just that phrase from the 
amendment to use as its heading, this edition takes sides in an 
argument over the text’s meaning.115 (Thirty years ago it probably 
 
new-york-times-jill-abramson-first-amendment.  
 113. Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96 (1789) (listing what became the First Amendment as 
“Art. III,” after amendments regarding representation and congressional compensation). 
 114. Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956).  
 115. Labelling the Second Amendment as “The Right to Bear Arms” does the same 
kind of interpretive work as the National Rifle Association’s selective quoting of the 
amendment in its headquarters. See, e.g., The Second’s Missing Half, MOTHER JONES 
(Jan./Feb. 1994), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/1994/01/seconds-
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would have been titled “Militia rights.”) The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Section One is called “Citizens of the United 
States.” Why not “Privileges or Immunities,” “Equal Protection,” 
or “Due Process”? But all of these choices—these arguments—
are hidden, in paratext. Of course, the point here is not that a 
lawyer would typically raise, in a constitutional dispute, a claim 
based on the Second Amendment’s heading in the Lexis-printed 
Constitution. Instead, by the time of that dispute, the paratext will 
have already done its subtle work influencing how people read, 
interpret, and understand the text.116 
If we took constitutional paratext more seriously, we might 
be more concerned about the variation across editions. If paratext 
truly shapes the meaning of text, we might be as interested in a 
“standardized” paratext for the Constitution as we are in a 
standardized core text. In any case, a project that commits to 
scrutinizing every single word of the Constitution as encountered 
must engage with the document’s paratext. 
For the Constitution, a comprehensive list of paratextual 
elements might include: 
 




The size and order of each Arti-
cle, section, or amendment.117 
 
  
The Preamble. The Preamble is debatably text 
and not paratext. (Is it more like 
the Articles or like the Attesta-
tion Clause and signatures? More 
like the amendments or like the 
letter from Congress introducing 
the amendments?) In any case, it 
 
missing-half/ (describing the wall-emblazoned quotation on the N.R.A.’s Washington, 
D.C. headquarters, which omits the first, militia-related, half of the amendment). 
 116. Occasionally, however, headings or labels actually do perform dispositive 
interpretative work in legal disputes. See, e.g., Daniel B. Listwa, Comment, Uncovering the 
Codifier’s Canon: How Codification Informs Interpretation, 127 YALE L.J. 464 (2017) 
(analyzing the significant weight placed on statute section captions by the Supreme Court 
in Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. __ (2015)). 
 117. See discussion, infra, of arguments made from—for example—the fact that 
Article I is “first,” and longest, or that the First Amendment is “first for a reason.” 
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provides an excellent case study 
in how to do paratextual analysis. 
The Supreme Court and scholars 
have insisted that the Preamble 
contains no substantive legal 
force, but have insisted just as 
forcefully that it carries broad in-
terpretative power.118 
  
Article VII’s interlinear notes. One of the oddest elements of the 
Congressional reading of the 
Constitution. The interlinear 
notes are corrections to the hand-
written parchment copy of the 
Constitution. Since those correc-
tions are inevitably worked into 
any printed copy of the Constitu-
tion, it is not clear why—if actual 
clauses of the document were go-
ing to be cut—these notes were 
left in. 
  
The Attestation Clause. Whether the Attestation Clause is 
text or paratext matters for the 
debate over whether the phrase 
“our Lord” is part of the enacted 
Constitution or not.119 But 
whether or not it is part of the le-
gal text, it is certainly part of the 
encountered text, and undoubt-
edly shapes people’s reading of 
the document (and understanding 
of the Framers). 
  
The signatures.120  
 
 118. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (“Although the Preamble 
indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established to the 
Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power.”); District 
of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570, 578 n.3 (“[I]n America ‘the settled principle of law is 
that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute . . . .’”) (internal citations 
omitted) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 146 (5th 
ed. 1992)); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 218–21 (1833 abridged ed.) (“The importance of examining the preamble . . . 
has been long felt . . . [but] [t]he preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers 
confided to the general government.”); AMAR, supra note 47, at 5–53 (2005). 
 119. See AMAR, supra note 23 at 69–73 (2015). 
 120. Michael Coenen has written a comprehensive analysis of the signatures in the 
Constitution. Michael Coenen, Note, The Significance of Signatures: Why the Framers 
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Official or unofficial section titles. Section headings like “Article I,” 
“Article II,” and “Article III” are 
paratextual elements that have 
been used to locate the otherwise-
unnamed principle of separation 
of powers in the text.121 Describ-
ing the first ten amendments as 
the “Bill of Rights” comes more 
from the Reconstruction era than 
the Founding.122 Should that pop-
ular bit of Reconstruction-era 
paratext be used to support argu-
ments for incorporation, or nine-
teenth-century understandings of 
the rights of the people? 
  
Editorial footnotes, bracketed in-
formation, italicization, or under-
lining. 
 
Any additional documents in-
cluded with a given edition of the 
Constitution. 
The Government Printing Office 
edition, for example, includes the 
Declaration of Independence in 
their copy of the Constitution. 
The best-selling ebook edition on 
Amazon—to move outside the 
realm of print-only—also includes 
the Declaration of Independence, 
bizarrely inserted between the 
seven Articles of the Constitution 
and the amendments.123 
  
The dates of ratification.124  
 
Signed the Constitution and What They Meant by Doing So, 119 YALE L.J. 966 (2010). He 
argues that the signatures served a marketing function in the ratification debate, both by 
advertising the illustrious figures behind its framing, and by binding those same figures 
into supporting the document. Nevertheless, he argues that the signatures can have 
interpretative force today, by highlighting the federalist nature of the document (the 
signatures are organized by state); establishing its connection to the Revolution (the 
reference to the twelfth year of an independent America); and by historicizing the 
document, emphasizing (for better and for worse) its Framing and Framers. 
 121. Amar, supra note 109, at 691 (2002) (“What are the words ‘Article I,’ ‘Article II,’ 
and ‘Article III’ doing if not marking a separation?.”). 
 122. Akhil Amar has correctly observed “the federal Constitution does not contain a 
separate section formally captioned as a ‘Bill of Rights’ . . . .” As part of the core, official 
text, maybe—but the paratext is teeming with references to the “Bill of Rights.” It pops 
up in almost every edition of the Constitution in print. 
 123. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2016). 
 124. See the discussion, infra, about the ratification dates historicizing effect on the 
document. 
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The minimized clauses of the Constitution have been 
extensively studied, like many of the amended clauses, and unlike 
the paratext or lapsed clauses. They are the clauses which have 
been reduced, through constitutional interpretation or action, to 
near-meaninglessness. They come in two types: minimization 
through Supreme Court precedent and (perhaps less common) 
through congressional or presidential action or inaction. 
Minimized clauses are the bread-and-butter of constitutional law 
casebooks, which demonstrate how the Constitution’s text has 
been interpreted and reinterpreted over two hundred years of 
Supreme Court cases.125 Unlike the other categories of 
constitutional irrelevancy, minimized clauses are not remotely 
obvious to the casual reader. In fact, they typically come as a 
surprise, since the minimization process by definition distorts the 
facial meaning of the text. “University professors who teach 
constitutional law often neglect to assign the document itself,” 
Akhil Amar has written. “The running joke is that reading the 
thing would only confuse students.”126 It is perhaps an American, 
or at least common-law, phenomenon: “[Civil lawyers] find it hard 
to understand why constitutional law courses and material begin, 
not with a study of the language and design of the Constitution, 
but with a case,” Mary Ann Glendon writes. She recounts the 
story of a student who asked about the role of the constitutional 
text, to which the professor responded, “Forget about the text!”127 
Amar and Glendon’s stories both illustrate the same point: some 
(most?) of the constitutional clauses are not fully intelligible 
without knowing the doctrine that surrounds them. 
The best methods for analyzing minimized clauses are 
probably doctrinal arguments (to discover the process of 
minimization) and historical arguments (to discover what the 
clause did, or should, mean). But actually finding—or agreeing 
on—which clauses have been minimized is especially difficult. 
 
 125. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOKES PAULSON ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2017) (including whole index sections for—along with dozens of cases 
referencing—the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Contracts Clause, the Guarantee 
Clause, and the Ninth Amendment, for example).   
 126. AMAR, supra note 52, at xi. 
 127. Glendon, supra note 25, at 107. 
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Figuring out which clauses have been read out of existence runs 
into a serious theoretical problem: calling something minimized 
requires a background assumption about what the clause’s proper 
scope should be. That is itself an act of interpretation—and a 
contestable one at that. For example, until McDonald and Heller, 
was the Second Amendment right to bear arms minimized (the 
Court had been reading the right into irrelevancy), or did those 
cases unduly maximize what until then had been properly read?128 
Tangentially, however, the argument and opinions in McDonald 
do provide us with what is probably the best example of a 
minimized clause in the Constitution: the Privileges or Immunities 
clause.129 
Privileges or Immunities “play hardly any role in judicial 
decisions interpreting the Constitution . . . .”130 This has been true 
since the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873.131 Indeed, “Slaughter-
House stands for one simple truth: that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause is utterly incapable of performing any real 
work . . . and that any argument premised on the Clause is 
therefore a constitutional non-starter.”132 And yet, thanks to 
originalist scholarship demonstrating the extent to which the 
Fourteenth Amendment framers emphasized this clause, it is 
“enjoying something of a renaissance among constitutional 
scholars.”133 What has been minimized can be rehabilitated.134 Or, 
as Akhil Amar has put it—quoting Billy Crystal’s character in the 
Princess Bride—”There’s a big difference between mostly dead 
 
 128. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 
637 (1989) (arguing that the then-pervasive lack of scholarly attention on the Second 
Amendment was a mistake, and—in the article’s influence—demonstrating how a 
minimized clause can be un-minimized). 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 130. Strauss, supra note 47, at 1551. 
 131. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 132. Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of 
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 646 (2000). 
 133. Id. 
 134. The Equal Protection Clause may be another example of a revival from 
minimized status. In Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes described the clause as “the usual last 
resort of constitutional arguments.” See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 274 (1927). In the 1940s, 
scholars were still describing it as a “dubious weapon in the armory of judicial review” 
after “eighty years of relative desuetude.” Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The 
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 341 (1949). The same word was used 
to describe the clause in Bakke: “decades of relative desuetude.” Regents of Univ. of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). Now, of course, Equal Protection is one of 
the centerpieces of constitutional law and argumentation. 
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and all dead.”135 Because of Slaughterhouse, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause is mostly dead; can it be revived? 
Justice Scalia did not think so. In the McDonald oral 
argument, he asked counsel for the petitioners why they had 
suggested using Privileges or Immunities, rather than Due 
Process, to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states. 
“[W]hy are you asking us to overrule 150, 140 years of prior law . 
. . when you can reach your result under substantive due—I mean, 
you know, unless you’re bucking for a . . . place on some law 
school faculty . . . .”136 Justice Thomas, however, strongly 
disagreed. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas wrote that 
the Second Amendment “applies to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”137 
He referred to the Court’s “marginalization”138 of the Clause, and 
argued that “this case presents an opportunity to . . . begin the 
process of restoring the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment . 
. . .”139 More recently, Justice Thomas has found an ally on this 
subject in Justice Gorsuch.140 But the debate is an old one. In 1935, 
the Court struck down a Vermont tax law on—among other 
grounds—the privileges or immunities clause, prompting a 
strongly-worded dissent from Justice Stone: “Feeble indeed is an 
attack on a statute,” he wrote, “which can gain any support from 
the almost forgotten privileges and immunities clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”141 He continued: “Since the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment at least forty-four cases have been 
brought to this Court in which state statutes have been assailed as 
infringements of the privileges or immunities clause. Until today, 
none has held that state legislation infringed that clause.”142 
 
 135. Interview with Akhil Amar, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University (Feb. 20, 
2017). 
 136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 
(2010) (No. 08-1521) 
 137. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 138. Id. at 809. 
 139. Id. at 813. 
 140. See Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __ (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“the 
appropriate vehicle for incorporation may well be the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.”). See also Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, The Once and Future 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. (2019) (“a Supreme Court 
majority willing to take the clause seriously” is “what it will take for a true rebirth of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause”). 
 141. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443 (1935). 
 142. Id. at 445–46. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment is an excellent case study in 
minimized clauses, since there is now broad agreement that 
Privileges or Immunities means more than it can be cited for, as a 
result of judicial action. The disagreement is what to do about it: 
restore Privileges or Immunities (Thomas, and maybe Gorsuch) 
or accept Due Process incorporation and move on (the rest of the 
Court). Indeed, to the extent that the Court recognizes and 
regrets a “minimization,” it can either choose to restore that 
minimized clause, or “maximize” another clause in compensation. 
Perhaps this solves part of the problem, but it also makes the text 
of the Constitution doubly-unintelligible.143  In other words, now 
two clauses do not mean what they seem to say. That is arguably 
what has happened between the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
(minimized), and the Due Process Clause (maximized).144 
Other examples of minimization are much more arguable, 
and no other clause may have been quite so dramatically read out 
of existence. Different citizens and scholars will feel that their pet 
clause has been unfairly or unwisely diminished. But, as a 
provisional gesture towards completing the taxonomy of 
irrelevancy, which clauses have had good cases made for them as 
being minimized? 
 
Table 4. The Minimized Constitution 
 
Clause Arguments about minimization 
  
The Declare War Clause. Sanford Levinson, for example, has described 
the way in which—in a single lifetime—Con-
gress’s power to declare war has become “fun-
damentally irrelevant.”145 
 
 143. See, e.g. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND (1995). 
 144. See, e.g., CNN Transcript of Kavanaugh Supreme Court Hearing, CNN (Sept. 5, 
2018), available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1809/05/cnr.08.html (“So I think 
the Ninth Amendment and the privileges and immunities clause and the Supreme Court’s 
doctrine of substantive due process are three roads that someone might take that all really 
lead to the same destination under the precedent of the Supreme Court now . . . .”). 
 145. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006) (“It is safe 
to say that no president, of either political party, feels significantly constrained by the 
Declare War Clause of Article I.”). 
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The Contracts Clause. James Ely has written that “the contract 
clause is no longer the subject of much judi-
cial solicitude or academic interest. Since the 
1930s the once potent contract clause has 
been largely relegated to the outer reaches of 
constitutional law.”146 Justice Gorsuch 
agrees—and indeed, may be looking to revive 
the clause.147 
  
The Guarantee Clause. Senator Charles Sumner called the Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of republican forms of gov-
ernment in the states “the sleeping giant in 
the Constitution.”148 It is still unenforced—or 
minimized—by the Court, largely through 
justiciability doctrines.149 As with other mini-
mized clauses, though, the giant may yet 
wake up.150 
  
The Public Use Clause. Justice Thomas has argued that decisions like 
Kelo v. City of New London151 make up “a 
string of cases construing the Public Use 
Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the 
slightest nod to its original meaning.”152 
  
The Ninth Amendment. Mitchell Gordon, in his article Getting to the 
Bottom of the Ninth, has described the ways 
in which “[f]ew courts have ever used it [the 
Ninth Amendment] as the basis of a decision; 
the U.S. Supreme Court has never done 
so.”153 Among constitutional litigators, the 
 
 146. James Ely, Still in Exile? The Current Status of the Contract Clause, Vanderbilt 
Law Research Paper No. 19-04 at 1 (2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3318590. 
See also Citing later to Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 890-
91 (1987) (“the clause is now for the most part a dead letter.”); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 
379 U.S. 497 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of using Home Building 
& Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell to “practically read the Contract Clause out of the 
Constitution”). 
 147. Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. __ (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“For much of its 
history, this Court construed the Contracts Clause in this [strong] light. . . . More recently, 
though, the Court has charted a different course. . . . [The modern] test seems hard to 
square with the Constitution’s original public meaning.”). 
 148. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner). 
 149. Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. (2018). 
 150. Id. at 4 (“several scholars have predicted that the eventual demise of the political 
question barrier to judicial enforcement of the Guarantee Clause is only a matter of 
time.”). 
 151. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 152. Id. at 506. 
 153. Mitchell Gordon, Getting to the Bottom of the Ninth, 50 IND. L. REV. 421, 423 
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amendment is “all but imaginary,”154 and in 
“sophisticated legal circles . . . mentioning the 
Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to get a 
laugh.”155 
  







Gerard N. Magliocca has argued that “the 
current reapportionment process violates 
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,”157 but acknowledges that it has “never 
been enforced”158 in a “century of neglect.”159 
 
VI. THE VALUE OF THE PARTS WE SKIP 
We—scholars, lawyers, judges, politicians, and citizens 
generally—need to stop skipping the parts we skip. We need to 
take seriously the oft-repeated assumption that every word in our 
short Constitution matters.160 That is the fundamental project of 
this Article. Either to validate that assumption—if every word 
matters, let’s actually look at every word; or to reveal its 
inaccuracy—every word doesn’t matter, after all. Having 
identified and catalogued all the parts we skip, what have we 
learned? Do all the words in the Constitution matter? Can they 
all be used? What makes the ignored provisions different from the 
enforced provisions, and what makes them different from each 
other? 
In the summer of 1787, James Madison worried about what 
would become a lapsed clause of the Constitution. “So long a 
 
(2017). 
 154. Id., at 424 (quoting Randy Barnett). 
 155. Id. (quoting John Hart Ely). 
 156. See discussion, supra. 
 157. Gerard N. Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2018). 
 158. Id. at 110. 
 159. Id. at 105. 
 160. A sentiment expressed generally supra notes 26, 27, 28. This sentiment is also 
addressed in each of the articles cited above to rehabilitate individual skipped parts of the 
Constitution. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 157, at 105. (“[I]t is time to treat Section Two 
of the Fourteenth Amendment with the respect due to a constitutional provision.”); 
Gordon, supra note 153, at 425 (“[T]he Constitution contains no known exception under 
which we may ignore provisions on the ground that they are tough to understand.”) 
(referring to the Ninth Amendment). 
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term,” he said to the Constitutional Convention, regarding the 
1808 clauses, “will be more dishonorable to the National character 
than to say nothing about it in the Constitution.”161 What is in the 
Constitution matters—symbolically, historically—even when 
those clauses have no legal impact anymore. That much should be 
obvious from the strong reaction to the congressional reading of 
the Constitution, and its elision past the inoperative Three-Fifths 
Clause. To examine the historical and symbolic significance of the 
parts we skip should be reason enough to study them. But this 
Article goes further, showing the ways in which sections deemed 
legally irrelevant might actually be useful for legal argumentation 
after all. Indeed, while all four kinds of ignored provisions 
currently lack legal force, they all offer some interpretative force. 
The amended portions have anticanonical, or intertextual force; 
the lapsed clauses have intratextual or paradigm case force; the 
paratext has textual or historical force; and the minimized 
portions have originalist (and dormant legal) force. 
Mark Graber, and others, have lamented the ways in which 
parts of the Fourteenth Amendment in particular have been 
“forgotten.”162 Looking more closely at this amendment as an 
example—with our specific categories of irrelevancy now in 
mind—can help us analyze this “forgetting” in much clearer 
detail. Section One’s Privileges or Immunities Clause has been 
minimized. But minimized clauses can come back (its neighbor, 
the Equal Protection Clause, is a case in point163). So too with 
Section Two’s Reapportionment Clause—it was minimized, never 
used—but it may yet have teeth. That clause’s limitation of the 
reapportionment penalty, meanwhile, was amended—by the 
Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. In that amending we 
can read a structural argument towards an ever-expanding base of 
suffrage (male becomes male and female; eighteen becomes 
twenty-one). The clauses of sections two, three, and four that have 
to do with the Confederacy are lapsed. They specifically apply to 
circumstances that have permanently changed, and—unlike the 
minimized clauses—can never be legally enforced on their own. 
But they can help us interpret other clauses (what the text means 
by “debt”) or derive structural principles from the whole text 
 
 161. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
at 530 (1987 bicentennial edition). 
 162. Graber, supra note 71 (focusing on sections two through four). 
 163. Supra note 134. 
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(against, for instance, the legacies of secession and slavery). The 
whole amendment is the longest in the Constitution—a 
paratextual argument about its primacy. But it’s also 
“Fourteenth,” a paratextual argument against its significance (if 
the First Amendment is first for a reason, is the Fourteenth 
fourteenth for a reason?).164 Minimized, amended, lapsed, 
paratext—each part is ignored for a different reason; each part 
can be put to different use. 
Part of this project has been descriptive, part has been 
prescriptive. How can scholars or lawyers organize the ignored 
parts of the Constitution—and how should we use them? In terms 
of organization, the taxonomy can show us the relative frequency 
of different categories of irrelevancy. Depending on how one 
counts the paratext, most of the irrelevant clauses are lapsed—
even though the legal and political cultures probably focus more 
on minimized or amended clauses. The taxonomy also reveals 
who or what changes the Constitution. Amended clauses have 
been changed by “We the People,” through Congress and the 
states. Lapsed clauses have been changed by time or history. 
Paratext has been changed by publishers and editors of the text. 
And minimized clauses have been changed by (usually) the 
judiciary. We may feel differently about each of those actors’ right 
to tinker with the Constitution; the taxonomy helps us see who 
has done what to which parts of the document. And the taxonomy 
assembles and organizes what may have seemed to be 
disconnected pieces of scholarship: Coenen on the signatures in 
the Constitution, Amar on the Attestation Clause, Graber on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the student note on the Twenty 
Dollars Clause, for instance. 
Going forward, there is work to be done in each category of 
irrelevancy. Scholars, lawyers, politicians, and citizens generally 
need to have a better understanding of which parts of the 
 
 164. Is there a paratextual change that could improve the reading, to highlight the 
Fourteenth Amendment better? Growing up, I went to a grade school that had been 
founded in 1628; there was a plaque on a wall listing every head of school since that 
founding. One’s eyes could glaze over the list of unfamiliar names (Jan Stevensen, William 
Verstius, Daniel Bratt . . .) until one got to a line break in between two heads of school, 
and the striking note: “The School was interrupted by the Revolutionary War.” Imagine if 
the amendments, listed one after another after another, suddenly reached a similarly 
disruptive, truthful line break between amendments twelve and thirteen: “The United 
States temporarily broke apart during the Civil War.” Imagine then how striking the 
rightly-named Reconstruction Amendments would seem. 
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Constitution truly have been amended—the congressional 
reading and each of the printed and online editions disagree about 
the amendments’ direct and indirect impacts. We need to stop 
ignoring the lapsed clauses, and mine them more thoroughly for 
meaning and guidance. We need to continue historical research 
towards understanding—and then perhaps rehabilitating—
minimized clauses.165 And we need to recognize the interpretative 
impact of paratext, and react accordingly. If the editors and 
readers of printed and online editions of the Constitution feel like 
paratext gets in the way, it should generally be minimized. If we 
think the edition-specific paratext twists or distorts what should 
be a common-ground document, then the paratext should be 
standardized (like the text itself). If we think that the paratext is 
essential to our understanding of this two-century-old document, 
then we should celebrate and expand its role in editions of the 
Constitution. We can, for instance, release the paratext from the 
odd bracket or footnote, and print the Constitution similarly to 
most modern editions of Shakespeare: with the original (relatively 
untouched) text on one page, and lots of paratext (notes, 
definitions, history) on the facing page. 
To continue the Shakespeare metaphor for a moment: It is 
clear that the “irrelevant” clauses are less important than the 
legally-active clauses in the text, like the Commerce or Equal 
Protection Clauses. It is similarly clear that Hamlet, or Macbeth is 
more important than, say, the Merry Wives of Windsor or Timon 
of Athens. But at the margin, do we need another production of 
Hamlet, or can we take at least one look at Timon? In discussing 
the Attestation Clause, a prime example of paratext, Akhil Amar 
has noted that “the Supreme Court has never quoted this clause . 
. . and many constitutional experts have literally never given the 
clause a moment’s thought.”166 These clauses surely deserve at 
least a moment’s thought—indeed, they deserve much more. 
 
 165. Much of this textual-historical research is currently being done by originalist 
scholars, but one need not be an originalist to be interested in minimized clauses. An 
originalist would feel that the meaning of a given clause is “fixed” at the moment of its 
ratification, and that current judges are “constrained” by that meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Constraint Principle (draft as of Apr. 3, 2019), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940215. A non-originalist can still be interested in knowing an 
earlier, alternative, or enlarged meaning of a phrase. The non-originalist is not bound to 
this older, larger meaning, but can choose whether or not the law would be better served 
by that expanded meaning. 
 166. AMAR, supra note 23, at 83. 
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So what should Congress have done in 2011? If they really 
insisted on demonstrating that some parts of the Constitution 
have been superseded, that some parts are without legal force, 
that some parts are “constitutionally irrelevant,” then they should 
have gone a lot further. They should have cut the ratification 
dates, the interlinear notes, the 1808 clauses, and the ratification 
instructions. They should have cut the signatories and the 
preamble to the Bill of Rights. They should have changed “male” 
and “twenty-one” to “male and female” and “eighteen.” They 
should have added a caveat to the direct tax clause, explaining 
that the Sixteenth Amendment allowed for an income tax. 
Perhaps they should have cut the Preamble—after all, it is not part 
of the Constitution as it “operates today”—at least not in terms 
of legally-forceful provisions. Or, even better, they should just 
have read the document unedited. James Madison lost that debate 
in 1789.  Deciding what is relevant, and what is irrelevant, is a 
difficult business—even with a taxonomy. 
 
